This paper studies the patterns of fiscal stimuli in the OECD countries propagated by the global crisis. Overall, we find that the USA net fiscal stimulus was modest relative to peers, despite it being the epic center of the crisis, and having access to relatively cheap funding of its twin deficits. The USA is ranked at the bottom third in terms of the rate of expansion of the consolidated government consumption and investment of the 28 countries in sample. Contrary to historical experience, emerging markets had strongly countercyclical policy during the period immediately preceding the Great Recession and the Great Recession. Many developed OECD countries had procyclical fiscal policy stance in the same periods. Federal unions, emerging markets and countries with very high GDP growth during the pre-recession period saw larger net fiscal stimulus on average than their counterparts. We also find that greater net fiscal stimulus was associated with lower flow costs of general government debt in the same or subsequent period.
I.

Introduction
The aftermath of the global crisis of 2008-9 intensified the debate about the efficacy of fiscal policy.
2 While most of the OECD countries and numerous emerging markets responded with fiscal stimuli in the first phase of crisis, growing "fiscal fatigue" seems to proliferate in 2010, either because of concerns about the efficacy of fiscal policy (the debate in the UK, for example), concerns about the future cost of public debt (the debate in the USA), or by the sense that the recovery is already underway in some countries (China).
This paper takes a positive perspective to these issues by focussing on measuring the size of the net fiscal stimuli across countries. Having a measure of the magnitude of fiscal stimuli enacted during the Great Recession is a necessary condition for understating the impact of fiscal policy during this period. Taking the benchmark of the previous literature regarding the procyclicality of fiscal policy in developing countries, and the greater countercyclicality of fiscal stance in the OECD countries (Kaminsky et al., 2004 and the reference therein), we aim to rank countries by the revealed countercyclicality of their fiscal stimuli. We also investigate a host of other important positive questions associated with fiscal stimuli, including, to what degree the USA, a country that was the epic center of the crisis, and a country that has enjoyed the exorbitant privilege (i.e., relatively easy funding of its fiscal and current account deficits), engaged in larger fiscal stimuli than other countries? Does the federal structure of a country matter for the net fiscal stimulus? What is the association between the fiscal stimuli and the flow costs of servicing the public debt? Have we observed the old patterns of procyclically fiscal policy in developing countries during the Great Recession?
To answer questions about the size of the fiscal stimulus during the Great Recession, this paper uses quarterly data to measure the expansion in the pure fiscal expenditures of the consolidated government, the central government and the state and local governments for OECD countries. Some OECD members are also emerging markets and/or "federations". 3 Pure fiscal expenditure is the real consumption and investment expenditure (C+I) at any level of government. We refer to increases in C+I of the consolidated government as "net fiscal stimulus".
We use the data on pure fiscal expenditures to address 5 questions:
1. Which countries delivered a large net fiscal stimulus during the Great Recession?
How did the growth of the pure fiscal expenditure during this period compare to its growth and to GDP growth during the pre-crisis period?
2.
To what extent was fiscal policy at the consolidated government level rates of consolidated government C+I that were more than one standard deviation lower than the average growth rates during the pre-crisis period.
In table 3, we construct the confidence intervals based on the pre-crisis GDP growth. If the GDP had continued to grow at the pace it was growing at in the pre-crisis period, keeping the growth of C+I within these confidence intervals would have kept the expected size of the government stable with respect to GDP. Five countries -Australia, Canada, Chile, Korea and Portugal -had an average QoQ growth of C+I during 2009Q1-2010Q1 that was more than one standard deviation higher than the average GDP growth in the pre-recession period, indicating an effective stimulus effort in these countries. On the other hand, in nine countries -Austria, Czech
Republic, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Poland, Turkey and USA -the average growth of C+I 5 Throughout the paper, significance is measured at the 10 percent level.
during 2009Q1-2010Q1 was lower than the mean GDP growth during pre-crisis period by more than one standard deviation.
IV. On the countercyclicality of fiscal policy in different countries
Emerging markets had strongly countercyclical policy during the period immediately preceding the Great Recession and the Great Recession. Many non-emerging OECD countries had procyclical fiscal policy stance in the same periods, contrary to historical experience.
A large body of empirical literature suggests that fiscal policy has been countercyclical in the developed countries, and procyclical in emerging and developing economies in the past (Kaminsky et.al., 2004 and references therein) . To test whether and to what extent fiscal policy was countercyclical between the expansionary phase immediately preceding the Great Recession and the Great Recession period, we compute the amplitude of fiscal policy, as in Kamisky et. al., (2004) . This measure is the difference between the (compound annual) growth rate of C+I at the consolidated government level during the "good time", 2004Q1-2007Q1 and the growth rate during the "bad time". We consider two periods to measure the growth rate during the "bad Figure 2 shows that over half the countries in sample had a countercyclical policy, with the strongest countercyclicality being in Mexico, Australia, Korea, Finland, Portugal and Germany. The USA also had a mildly countercyclical policy over these periods. The most procyclical policy was in Greece, Ireland, Hungary, Iceland and Turkey.
When only the second half of the recession period is considered -2009Q1-2010Q1, Figure 3 shows that USA was among the 13 countries that had a procyclical policy stance, as the C+I of the consolidated government grew faster during 2004Q1-2007Q1 than it did during 2009Q1-2010Q1. Of the 7 countries in the sample that are also federal unions, three -USA, Belgium and Austria -had procyclical fiscal policy over the cycle, whereas four -Mexico, Australia, Canada and Germany -saw countercyclical fiscal policy.
Further, in Tables 4 and 5 In Table 5 , we present the correlations of the cyclical components of GDP and consolidated government C+I, after extracting the trend using Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. Here, the results are a bit different. For federal unions, the correlations in both periods (i.e., pre-and post-2007) are positive, whereas for non-emerging OECD, they are negative and significant in both periods. For emerging markets, the fiscal policy is strongly countercyclical in the post-2007
period. There are two potential sources of the differences in results between the two tables: one, that the correlations using the HP filtered series uses information on good times as well as bad times, and two, that the correlations using cyclical components do not allow for lags in implementation of policy. The figure shows that in federal unions, the average growth in C+I during the prerecession period, 2004Q1-2007Q1 was lower than in non-federal unions, but during the recession period, 2007Q4-2010Q1, the average growth rate of C+I in federal unions was about twice that in non-federal unions. EMU countries had a rapid increase in C+I in the pre-recession period, with average quarterly growth rates over twice the average growth in non-EMU countries, but during the recession period, their average growth in C+I was less than half the size of the average growth in non-EMU countries. The same pattern holds if one compares only the federal unions amongst EMU countries against non-EMU federal unions. In emerging economies, on the other hand, fiscal expenditures of the consolidated government grew at a slower pace during the prerecession period than during the recession period, relative to non-emerging OECD countries. The same holds for countries that were in the high or low growth categories during the pre-recession period.
V. Net fiscal stimulus across groups of countries
Not all of the differences in average growth are significantly difference from zero, due in part to the large differences between countries within groups, and over time. 
VI. Net fiscal stimulus and the flow costs of public debt
Greater net fiscal stimulus was associated with lower flow costs of general government debt in the same or subsequent period. of public debt during the same period is significantly different from zero, indicating that the countries with higher fiscal stimulus had lower flow costs of public debt during this period. For 6 The t-tests are conducted on annual data, to smooth over large variations in quarter-on-quarter growth rates within the year. 7 The two groups overlap to a large extent. 8 As in Aizenman and Pasricha (2010) , the interest rate used is the interest rate on local currency government bonds of the maturity closest to the effective maturity of government debt in each country. The nominal interest rates were converted to real rates by subtracting the rate of change of GDP deflator. Both the r and g series are available at a quarterly frequency by the debt GDP ratio is available at annual frequency. For data sources of each of the three series, r, g, and d, see the appendix.
the full recession period, all the correlations are negative and significant. For none of the recession periods, are the correlations between the net fiscal stimulus and the next period flow cost of public debt is positive, let alone significant. In Figure 5 , we plot the compound annual growth of C+I during 2007Q4-2010Q1 and the average of the flow costs over this period. The countries with very large contractions of C+I during this period had very large flow costs of public debt , whereas countries with very large expansions of C+I during this period (Chile, Mexico, Australia, Korea, Poland) had very low, close to zero or negative flow costs. In Figure   6 , we look at what is driving the flow costs by plotting its components over the period 2007Q4-2010Q1. The countries with the highest average flow costs had a combination of high interest rates and low real GDP growth rates, whereas for countries with the highest net fiscal stimuli, the real interest rate was similar to that in medium flow costs countries but the real GDP growth rate was considerably higher. of (r-g) for each country. It shows that for some countries with low delivered stimulus, the future expected flow costs of the public debt are also low.
VII. Central and state level spending in the delivery of net fiscal stimulus
The data on central and state level spending was available for six countries -Norway, USA, United Kingdom, Sweden, Iceland and Australia, of which USA and Australia are federal unions. In Table 8 , we present the compound annual growth rates of real GDP and of C+I for To gauge the degree of countercyclicality of fiscal policy for each of the countries, in In Table 9 , we present panel regressions, using fixed effects estimators, for explaining 
VIII. Conclusions and policy implications
The results of this paper suggest open questions in need for future research. We close the paper with outline of some of these issues. The overall timid fiscal stimuli of the developed members of the OECD (including the US) relative to emerging markets may be either the outcome of a well functioning automatic stabilizers in the higher GDP per capita countries, or possible overreaction of developed OECD countries that switched from fiscal laxity during the great moderation to relative fiscal frugality during the Great Recession. While Greece and
Ireland had very limited fiscal space during the Great Recession, this seems not to be the case with most other OECD countries. The evidence of the relatively low projected flow cost of servicing the future public debt for about half of the OECD countries raises related questions. 4.46 Note: SD stands for standard deviation of quarter-on-quarter (QoQ) C+I growth during the pre-crisis period. Annualized QoQ growth rates that exceed the upper bound of the narrower confidence interval are given in blue, while those that are below the lower bound of the narrower confidence interval are given in red. SD stands for standard deviation of quarter-on-quarter (QoQ) GDP growth during the pre-crisis period. Annualized QoQ growth rates that exceed the upper bound of the narrower confidence interval are given in blue, while those that are below the lower bound of the narrower confidence interval are given in red. Note: Recession Periods are those with at least two consecutive quarters of negative real GDP growth. All such recession quarters are included in correlation computation. One-year forward YoY change refers to change between the 4 th quarter from the recession quarter and the current recession quarter. Average QoQ change over the next year is the average of the quarter-on-quarter changes over the four quarters after the recession quarter. Great Recession Period refers to recession quarters during 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, up to 2010Q1 . Values in red are correlations that are significant at 10 percent level. The t-tests use the variation in annual average of quarter on quarter growth rates of C+I for each country to test for difference in group means over each period, assuming unequal variances between groups. See footnotes to Figure 4 for definitions of various country groups. Group 1 is the first group mentioned in the row titles. For example, in the first row, group 1 refers to federal unions and group 0 is the alternative group, in this case, nonfederal unions. Table 1 . TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN Table 1 . FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN Table 1 . FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN HUN TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR Table 1 . TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN Note: Countries labelled in red are federal unions. For a list of country names associated with country codes, see Table 1 . 
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Growth of government C+I/growth of GDP
Note: The growth rates used to compute the ratio are the compound annual growth rates over the period. Negative values of the ratio indicate a counter-cyclical policy as it indicates that the government spending is contracting when GDP is increasing, and vice versa. In all countries except Australia, the GDP growth during this period was negative. Details of the data used in this graph are in Table 8 . 
Note: The growth rates used to compute the ratio are the compound annual growth rates over the period. Negative values of the ratio indicate a counter-cyclical policy as it indicates that the government spending is contracting when GDP is increasing, and vice versa. In USA, Sweden and Australia, the GDP growth over this period was positive. Details of the data used in this graph are in Table 8 . The only exception to the above would be if the government ends up owning the enterprise fully and it is not classified as a "public corporation", but as a government department. 9 However, during this crisis, most interventions by governments were considered to be temporary and a decision was taken by the statistical authorities in the US, UK and EU to not include any such interventions in the national accounts, except to the extent described above. This may change in the future, for example if at some point, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac become classified as part of the government sector.
For detailed discussions of the national income accounts and the treatments of financial bailouts in each of the above three regions, see the following documents:
System of National Accounts:
European Commission, International Monetary Fund, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, United Nations and World Bank. 2008. System of National Accounts.
9 Accounts of public corporations are not included in government sector accounts.
